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Abstract
Traditionally quantitative games such as mean-payoff games and discount sum
games have two players – one trying to maximize the payoff, the other trying to
minimize it. The associated decision problem, “Can Eve (the maximizer) achieve,
for example, a positive payoff?” can be thought of as one player trying to attain a
payoff in the interval (0,∞). In this paper we consider the more general problem
of determining if a player can attain a payoff in a finite union of arbitrary intervals
for various payoff functions (liminf, mean-payoff, discount sum, total sum). In
particular this includes the interesting exact-value problem, “Can Eve achieve a
payoff of exactly (e.g.) 0?”
1 Introduction
Quantitative two-player games on graphs have been extensively studied in the verifica-
tion community [6, 8, 10, 15, 19]. Those models target applications in reactive system
synthesis with resource constraints. In these games two players, Eve and Adam, inter-
act by moving a token around a weighted, directed graph, for a possibly infinite number
of moves. This interaction results in a play which is an infinite path in the graph. The
value of the play is computed by applying a payoff function to the sequence of weights
of the edges traversed along the path. Typical payoff functions are (lim)sup, (lim)inf,
mean-payoff, (total) sum, and discounted sum.
In the literature is usual to assume that Eve is attempting to maximize the payoff
and Adam is attempting to minimize it. In this context all these games are determined,
that is the maximum that Eve can ensure is equal to the minimum that Adam can ensure,
and this value can be computed in polynomial time for (lim)inf and (lim)sup [5], and in
pseudo-polynomial time for mean-payoff, discounted sum, and total sum [10,19]. The
associated decision problem is the threshold problem: Given a game graph, a payoff
function and a threshold ν does Eve have a strategy to ensure all consistent plays have
payoff at least ν? The threshold problems for the aforementioned payoff functions are
all closely related, and it is known that Eve and Adam can play optimally in those
games with memoryless strategies [11]. Consequently the decision problem for all
those games is in NP∩ coNP. In fact, it can be shown in UP∩ coUP for mean-payoff,
discounted sum, and total sum, and in PTIME for (lim)inf and (lim)sup.
The threshold problem can be seen as game in which Eve is trying to force the
payoff to belong to the interval of values [ν,∞). In this paper we consider the more
general problem of determining if a player can attain a payoff in a finite union of
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arbitrary intervals for the classical payoff functions mentioned above. That is, we are
interested in the following question: Given a weighted arena G and a finite union of
real intervals, what is the complexity of determining if Eve has a winning strategy to
ensure the payoff of any consistent play lies within the interval union? In particular
this includes the interesting exact-value problem: Can Eve achieve a payoff of exactly
ν? Such objectives arise when considering efficiency constraints, for example can a
system achieve a certain payoff without exceeding a certain target? We consider two
versions of our problem depending on whether the numeric inputs (weights, interval
bounds and discount factor) are given in binary or unary. We also consider the memory
requirements for a winning strategy both for Eve and Adam. Our games are a natural
subclass of multi-dimensional quantitative games (see e.g. [6]), however our results are
largely incomparable with that paper as we consider a wider array of payoff functions
and our objective corresponds to disjunctions of multi-dimensional objectives which
were not considered.
Payoff type Single interval Multiple intervals
Binary Unary
Liminf/limsup PTIME NP ∩ coNP PARITY GAME-c
Mean-payoff NP ∩ coNP PSPACE PARITY GAME-hard
Discounted sum (non-singleton) PSPACE-c PTIME
Discounted sum (exact value) PSPACE-hard ?
Total sum EXP-hard, EXPSPACE PSPACE-c
Table 1: Complexity of deciding the winner in interval games
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results of this paper: the first table highlights the
complexity results and the second table highlights the memory requirements for play-
ing optimally. While the classical threshold problems for weighted games can be solved
in PTIME for (lim)inf and (lim)sup and in NP∩coNP for mean-payoff, discounted sum
and total sum, and memoryless strategies always suffice, the situation for our interval
objectives is far richer:
• For liminf and limsup, we provide a polynomial time algorithm in the case of
a single interval. For a union of intervals, we show that these games are poly-
nomially equivalent to parity games: so we can solve them in NP ∩ coNP, and
a polynomial time algorithm for interval liminf games would provide a polyno-
mial time algorithm for parity games (a long-standing open question in the area).
Optimal strategies are memoryless for both players.
• For interval mean-payoff games, we provide a recursive algorithm that executes
Payoff type Single interval Multiple intervals
(Eve/Adam)
Liminf/limsup Positional
Mean-payoff Finite/Positional Infinite
Discounted sum (non-singleton) Finite
Discounted sum (exact value) Infinite
Total sum Finite/Infinite Infinite
Table 2: Memory requirements for interval games
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in polynomial space. This algorithm leads to a NP ∩ coNP algorithm in the
case of single interval objectives. While mean-payoff games can be solved in
polynomial time when weights are given in unary, we show here that interval
mean-payoff games are at least as hard as parity games even when weights are
given in unary. So, a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for interval mean-payoff
games would lead to a polynomial algorithm for parity games. For a union of
intervals, infinite memory may be necessary for both players, and for single in-
terval exponential memory may be necessary for Eve while Adam can always
play a memoryless strategy.
• Interval discounted sum games are complete for polynomial space when single-
ton intervals (and singleton gaps between intervals) are forbidden. The decidabil-
ity for the case when singletons are allowed is left open and it generalizes known
open problems in single player discounted sum graphs [1, 7]. Finite memory
suffices for both players in the non-singleton case and infinite memory is needed
for both players when singletons are allowed.
• For the total sum payoff, we establish a strong link with one counter parity games
that leads to a PSPACE-complete result for unary encoding and an EXPSPACE
solution for the binary encoding together with an EXP-hardness result. For single
interval games Eve need only play finite memory strategies, while she may need
infinite memory in the general case. In both cases, Adam may require an infinite
memory strategy.
Structure of the paper Section 2 introduces the necessary preliminaries. In Sections
3, 4, 5, and 6 we consider the decision problems and memory requirements for the lim-
inf/limsup, mean-payoff, discounted sum, and total sum payoff functions, respectively.
2 Preliminaries
A game graph is a tuple G = (V, V∃, E, w, q0) where (V,E,w) is an edge-weighted
graph, V∃ ⊆ V , and q0 ∈ V is the initial state. Without loss of generality we will
assume all weights are integers. In the sequel we will depict vertices in V∃ with squares
and vertices in V \V∃ with circles. In complexity analyses we will denote the maximum
absolute value of a weight in a game graph by W . If V ′ ⊆ V , we denote by G \V ′ the
game graph induced by V \ V ′.
A play in a game graph is an infinite sequence of states pi = v0v1 · · · where v0 = q0
and (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for all i. Given a play pi = v0v1 · · · and integers k, l we define
pi[k..l] = vk · · · vl, pi[..k] = pi[0..k], and pi[l..] = vlvl+1 · · · . We extend the weight
function to partial plays by setting w(pi[k..l]) =
∑l−1
i=k w((vi, vi+1)). A strategy for
Eve (Adam) is a function σ that maps partial plays ending with a vertex v in V∃ (V \V∃)
to a successor of v. A strategy has memory M if it can be realized as the output of a
finite state machine with M states. A memoryless (or positional) strategy is a strategy
with memory 1, that is, a function that only depends on the last element of the given
partial play. A play pi = v0v1 · · · is consistent with a strategy σ for Eve (Adam) if
whenever vi ∈ V∃ (vi ∈ V \ V∃), σ(pi[..i]) = vi+1.
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2.1 Payoff functions
A play in a game graph defines an infinite sequence of weights. We define below
several common functions that map such sequences to real numbers.
Liminf/limsup. The liminf (limsup) payoff is determined by the minimum (maxi-
mum) weight seen infinitely often. Given a play pi = v0v1 · · · we define:
lim inf(pi) = lim inf
i→∞
w(vi, vi+1) lim sup(pi) = lim sup
i→∞
w(vi, vi+1).
Note that by negating all weights and the endpoints of the intervals we transform a
limsup game to a liminf game and vice-versa.
Mean-payoff. The mean-payoff value of a play is the limiting average weight, how-
ever there are several suitable definitions because the running averages might not con-
verge. The mean-payoff values of a play pi we are interested in are defined as:
MP (pi) = lim inf
k→∞
1
k
w(pi[..k]) MP (pi) = lim sup
k→∞
1
k
w(pi[..k]).
As with liminf/limsup games we can switch between definitions by negating weights
and interval endpoints, so we will only consider the MP function.
Discounted sum. The discounted sum is defined by a discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1).
Given a play pi = v0v1 · · · , we define:
DSλ(pi) =
∞∑
i=0
λi · w(vi, vi+1).
Total sum. The total sum condition can be thought of as a refinement of the mean-
payoff condition, enabling discrimination between plays that have a mean-payoff of 0.
Given a play pi we define:
Total(pi) = lim inf
k→∞
w(pi[..k]) Total(pi) = lim sup
k→∞
w(pi[..k]).
As with liminf/limsup games we can switch between definitions by negating weights
and interval endpoints, so we will only consider the Total function.
2.2 Interval games
For a fixed payoff function F , an interval F game consists of a finite game graph and a
finite union of real intervals I = I1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ir . Given an interval F game (G, I), a play
pi in G is winning for Eve if F (pi) ∈ I and winning for Adam if F (pi) /∈ I . We say a
player wins the interval game if he or she has a strategy σ such that all plays consistent
with σ are winning for that player. For convenience we will assume the intervals are
non-overlapping and ordered such that sup Ii ≤ inf Ii+1 for all i.
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2.3 Parity games
A parity game is a pair (G,Ω) where G is a game graph (with no weight function) and
Ω : V → N is a function that assigns a priority to each vertex. Plays and strategies are
defined as with interval games. A play defines an infinite sequence of priorities, and
we say it is winning for Eve if and only if the minimal priority seen infinitely often is
even.
3 Liminf games
The first payoff function we consider is the lim inf function. Note that as this always
takes integer values, we can assume all intervals are closed or open as necessary. We
show below that deciding interval liminf games is polynomially equivalent to deciding
parity games. In particular the number of intervals is equal to the number of even
priorities required, so single interval liminf games are equivalent to parity games with
at most three priorities and can therefore be solved in polynomial time [16]. Further,
the range of the priorities are determined by range of the weight function and vice
versa, so this equivalence also holds for unary encoded interval liminf games.
Theorem 1. The following problems are polynomially equivalent:
(i) Deciding if Eve wins a unary encoded interval liminf game;
(ii) Deciding if Eve wins a binary encoded interval liminf game; and
(iii) Deciding if Eve wins a parity game.
Proof. (i)⇒(ii): Trivial.
(ii)⇒(iii): For this reduction, we use the following function which will also be used
in Section 6. Let I = I1∪I2 ∪· · ·∪Ir be a finite union of closed integer intervals such
that sup Ii < inf Ii+1 for all i. Define ΩI : Z→ [1, 2r + 1] as follows:
ΩI(n) =


2i if n ∈ Ii,
1 if n < inf I1, and
max{1 + 2i : sup Ii < n} otherwise.
Now suppose (G, I) is an interval liminf game. We transform the game graph G to
G′ as follows. Every edge e is sub-divided and the subdividing vertex is given priority
ΩI(w(e)). The original vertices of G are all given priority 2r + 1.
It is not difficult to see that there is a 1-1 correspondence between plays in G and
plays in G′, and that for any play in G, lim inf w(e) ∈ Ii for some i if and only if the
minimum priority in the corresponding play in G′ seen infinitely often is even.
(iii)⇒(i): To go the other direction, given a parity game played on G we transform
it to an interval liminf game played onG′ as follows. G′ is the weighted graph obtained
by setting the weight of an edge to be the priority at the vertex at the tail of the edge
(that is, the vertex for which the edge is outgoing). The intervals are singleton intervals
containing each of the even priorities that occur in G. Clearly any play in G is a play in
G′ and it is not difficult to see that for a play in G the minimum priority seen infinitely
often is even if and only if the lim inf of the weights of all edges in a play of G′ lie in
a given interval.
5
We observe that the above reductions between parity and liminf games do not sig-
nificantly alter the topology of the game graph (if at all). In particular, positional strate-
gies in one game readily translate to positional strategies in the other. It follows from
the positional determinacy of parity games [18], that:
Corollary 1. Positional strategies suffice for interval liminf games.
4 Mean-payoff games
In this section we investigate interval mean-payoff games. We give a recursive al-
gorithm that repeatedly asks for a solution for the mean-payoff threshold problem:
Given a game graph G and a threshold ν ∈ Q does Eve have a strategy to ensure
the (liminf) mean-payoff of all consistent plays is at least1 ν? As mentioned earlier
this problem is known to be in NP ∩ coNP, and solvable in time O(|V | · |E| · W )
and space O(|V | · log(|E| · W )) [4]. We denote this problem by MP∼ν(G) where
∼∈ {≥, >,≤, <} depending on whether Eve is maximizing or minimizing the payoff
and whether or not a payoff of ν is winning for Eve. It is well known [8] that the strict
threshold problem can be reduced to a non-strict threshold problem – this follows from
the fact that mean-payoff values are restricted to a finite set of rationals.
Our algorithm implies that for a fixed number of intervals the problem reduces
to the classic threshold problem (under polynomial-time Turing reductions). In Sec-
tion 4.3 we consider single interval mean-payoff games in more detail. In particular we
show that in this case finite memory strategies (indeed, positional strategies for Adam)
suffice for winning strategies. However, our first observation of this section is that in
general interval mean-payoff games may require infinite memory.
Lemma 1. Finite memory winning strategies are not sufficient in interval mean-payoff
games.
Proof. Consider the game in Figure 1 where I = (0, 1] ∪ [2,∞). Eve has an infinite
memory winning strategy in this game as follows. First she plays to q1. Then she
counts how many times Adam takes the loop (q1, q1). If Adam returns to q0 then Eve
takes the loop (q0, q0) the same number of times before returning to q1. Clearly any
play consistent with this strategy that only visits q0 finitely often will satisfy MP = 2,
and any play that visits q0 infinitely often will satisfy MP = 1. Therefore the strategy
is winning for Eve. Now suppose Eve plays a finite memory strategy σ with memory
M . We observe that any play consistent with σ that visits q0 either remains in q0 or
exits q0 in at most M steps – if a play stays in q0 for more than M steps then a memory
state must have been revisited, thus the strategy will keep the play in q0 indefinitely.
Consider the following (finite memory) strategy of Adam: whenever the play reaches
q1, take the loop (q1, q1)M+1 times then move to q0. We claim this strategy is winning
for Adam. If at some point the play consistent with σ and this strategy remains in q0
indefinitely then it has MP = 0, so it is winning for Adam. Otherwise the play exits
q0 infinitely often, that is the edge (q0, q1) is taken infinitely often. Let us break up the
play into the segments defined by successive occurrences of this edge. Following the
above argument the length of each of these segments is between M + 3 and 2M + 3,
and the weight of each of these segments is exactly 2M + 4. Thus the average weight
for each segment lies between 1 + 12M+3 and 2 −
2
M+3 inclusive. As M is fixed, it
follows that MP ∈ (1, 2) and thus the play is winning for Adam.
1or at most if she is minimizing the payoff
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q0 q1
1
2
1
0
Figure 1: Interval mean-payoff game (I = (0, 1] ∪ [2,∞)) which requires infinite
memory
4.1 Upper bounds
We now present an algorithm, Algorithm 1, for computing the winning regions in an
interval mean-payoff game.
Algorithm 1 MPI(G)
Input: A game graph G = (V, V∃, E, w, q0) and a finite union of real intervals I .
Output: (W ∃,W ∀) where W ∃ (W ∀) are the vertices from which Eve (Adam) has a
winning strategy.
if I = ∅ then
return (∅, V )
end if
a← inf I
if a = −∞ then
(W,W ′)← MPR\I(G) {G is G with V∃ and V \ V∃ swapped}
else
W ← ∅
repeat
(A,A′)← MP≻a(G) {If a ∈ I then ≻=≥ otherwise ≻=>}
(B,B′)← MP(−∞,a]∪I(G)
W ←W ∪A′ ∪B′
G← G \ (A′ ∪B′)
until A′ ∪B′ = ∅
end if
return (V \W,W )
The correctness of the algorithm is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let (G, I) be an interval mean-payoff game. MPI(G) correctly computes
the winning regions for Adam and Eve.
Proof. We observe that by symmetry the winning regions of MPI(G) are precisely the
complements of the winning regions of MPR\I(G). Thus the algorithm correctly com-
putes the winning regions for I if and only if correctly computes the winning regions
for R \ I . In particular we can assume that either I = ∅ or inf I > −∞.
The proof is by induction on the number of interval boundaries in I . If there are no
boundaries then I = ∅ and so MPI(G) returns the correct value: (∅, V ). Now suppose
a = inf I > −∞. Note that I ′ = (−∞, a] ∪ I has one interval boundary fewer
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than I , so by the induction hypothesis the recursive call in line 11 correctly computes
the winning regions of G for the interval I ′. Let Wi (i = 0, 1, . . .) denote the set of
vertices in W after i iterations. Note that the algorithm runs untilWn = Wn+1, and the
subgraph of G used in the i-th iteration is G \Wi−1. We prove by induction on i that
Adam has a winning strategy from every vertex in Wi. For i = 0, W0 = ∅ so the result
holds trivially. Now suppose Adam has a winning strategy from every vertex in Wi,
and let v ∈Wi+1\Wi. Either v is in the winning region of Adam for MP≻a(G\Wi) or
v is in the winning region of Adam for MPI′(G\Wi). In both cases the corresponding
winning strategy will ensure a payoff outside I and will therefore be winning for plays
restricted to G \Wi. Thus his strategy from v is to play this strategy until a vertex in
Wi is reached, whereupon he switches to the winning strategy from that vertex.
We now show that Eve has a winning strategy on the vertices in V \ W . Note
that on these vertices Eve has two strategies: a memoryless strategy σ> which ensures
MP ≻ a; and, by the inductive hypothesis, a strategy σ< which ensures a payoff in
the interval I ′. Also note that plays consistent with these strategies remain in V \W .
We now show how to combine these two strategies to obtain a winning strategy for the
interval I . For simplicity we will assume a ∈ I , if it is not the case, then the same
arguments apply by replacing a with the smallest payoff Adam can attain against σ>.
Let I1 be the interval of I with a = inf I1, and let t be any element of I1. The strategy
for Eve is to track the current average weight of the play so far. If it is less than t then
she plays σ> and if it is greater than or equal to t then she plays σ<. Clearly if she
changes strategy only finitely often then her strategy is winning: if she eventually only
plays σ> then the payoff will be in [a, t) ⊆ I1 ⊆ I; and if she eventually only plays σ<
then the payoff will be in [t,∞) ∩ I ′ ⊆ I . Now suppose the play causes Eve to switch
strategy infinitely often. The problem here is that when switching to σ> the average
weight may go below a, and if this happens infinitely often the lim inf average may be
below a. However, as σ> is memoryless, the average after n steps will never be more
than (|V |+1)W
n
below a: this is seen easiest by taking a = 0 and considering the total,
rather than the average, weight. This tends to 0 as n tends to ∞ hence MP is at least
a. As the average goes below t infinitely often, MP ≤ t. Therefore the payoff of the
play is in [a, t] ⊆ I1 ⊆ I , and hence the combined strategy is winning for Eve.
The running time for Algorithm 1 is |V |2r−1 ·MP, where MP is the running time
for an algorithm to solve the mean-payoff threshold problem. It is straightforward to
see that the algorithm can be implemented in polynomial space.
Theorem 2. Let G be a game graph and I a finite union of r real intervals. Whether
Eve wins the interval mean-payoff game (G, I) can be decided in timeO(|V |2r ·|E|·W )
and space O(r · |V | · log(|E| ·W )).
We observe that although the players may require infinite memory for a winning
strategy, Algorithm 1 shows that a winning strategy can be succinctly represented by
2r positional sub-strategies. It is not clear that given such a certificate whether there
exists an efficient algorithm for computing the winning region, however we believe that
this is the case. By the symmetry of the roles of the players, such an algorithm would
show that the interval mean-payoff game is both in NP and coNP.
Conjecture 1. Determining whether Eve wins an interval mean-payoff game is in NP∩
coNP.
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v0
v+
v−
v
p
p+ 1
p
p
p− 1
p
Figure 2: Vertex gadget for vertex v ∈ V \ V∃ with even priority p
4.2 Lower bound
The above conjecture would hold if we could solve interval mean-payoff games with
only polynomially many calls to the mean-payoff threshold problem. We now give a
lower bound for the complexity of deciding interval mean-payoff games which suggests
any such algorithm would yield quite remarkable results: we reduce parity games to
interval mean-payoff games with small weights and small interval bounds. In particular
this implies that any pseudo-polynomial time algorithm (including polynomially many
calls to the threshold problem) would yield a polynomial time algorithm for parity
games.
Theorem 3. There is a polynomial time reduction from parity games to unary-encoded
interval mean-payoff games.
Proof. Let (V, V∃, E, q0,Ω) be a (min-)parity game. Without loss of generality we
can assume that the set of priorites is contained in [0, |V |]. We construct an interval
mean-payoff game (V ′, V ′∃, E′, w, q′0, I) as follows.
• I = [0, 1)∪ [2, 3) ∪ · · · ∪ [n, n+ 1) where n is the smallest even integer greater
than or equal to |V |;
• V ′ = V ∪ V × {0,+,−}. For simplicity we write (v, ∗) as v∗;
• q′0 = q0;
• V ′∃ = V∃ ∪ {v
0, v+, v− : Ω(v) is even};
• E′ and w are constructed as follows:
– For each (v, w) ∈ E, (v, w0) ∈ E′ and the weight of this edge is Ω(v),
– For each v ∈ V : (v0, v+), (v0, v−), (v+, v), (v−, v) ∈ E′ all with weight
Ω(v), (v+, v+) ∈ E′ with weightΩ(v)+1, and (v−, v−) ∈ E′ with weight
Ω(v)− 1.
Intuitively, we replace each vertex in the original game with the gadget shown in Fig-
ure 2. If the priority of the vertex is even then the gadget is controlled by Eve, and if it
is odd then it is controlled by Adam. The last vertex in the gadget is controlled by the
player that controlled the original vertex.
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As the weights and interval boundaries are integers in [0, |V | + 1] this is clearly a
polynomial time translation to a unary-encoded interval mean-payoff game. We claim
that Eve wins the parity game if and only if she wins the interval mean-payoff game.
Suppose she has a positional winning strategy σ in the parity game. We define her strat-
egy σ′ as follows. For any vertex v ∈ V∃ she moves to the vertex gadget corresponding
to the vertex she would have moved to under σ. That is, σ′(v) = (σ(v), 0). Whenever
the play reaches a vertex gadget that she controls (i.e. a vertex v0 where v has even
priority p in the parity game), her strategy is to remain in the gadget until the average
weight of the current play lies in the interval [p, p + 12 ]. She does this by moving to
v+ if the current average is below the interval, and to v− if the average is above, and
then staying at that vertex until the average weight reaches the interval. Note that after
sufficiently many steps this will always be possible. When the average weight lies in
[p, p+ 12 ] she moves to v and the game continues. There is a clear 1-1 correspondence
between plays consistent with σ and plays consistent with σ′, and if a play in the parity
game visits a vertex with even priority p infinitely often, then the running average of
the corresponding play will lie in the interval [p, p + 12 ] ⊆ I infinitely often. By con-
struction, Adam can never reduce the mean-payoff below the interval [p, p+ 12 ] unless
the play reaches a gadget corresponding to a vertex of lower priority. This is important
because we use the lim inf definition of mean-payoff. Further, if he chooses to remain
in a gadget indefinitely he will lose. As all plays consistent with σ have the property
that the minimal priority visited infinitely often is even, it follows that for all plays pi
consistent with σ′ there is some even priority p such that MP (pi) ∈ [p, p + 12 ] ⊆ I .
Thus the σ′ is winning for Eve. For the converse we see that Adam can translate a
winning strategy from the parity game in the same manner.
4.3 Single interval
We now examine in more detail the case when I is a single interval. As we can replace
any strict threshold call with a non-strict threshold we can assume without loss of
generality that I is closed. The simplification of Algorithm 1 to a single closed interval
is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 MP[a,b](G)
Input: A game graph G and a bounded closed real interval [a, b].
Output: (W ∃,W ∀) where W ∃ (W ∀) are the vertices from which Eve (Adam) has a
winning strategy.
W ← ∅
repeat
(A,A′)← MP≥a(G)
(B,B′)← MP≤b(G \A′)
W ←W ∪A′ ∪B′
G← G \ (A′ ∪B′)
until A′ ∪B′ = ∅
return (V \W,W )
We observe that Algorithm 2 makes at most a linear number of calls to the mean-
payoff threshold problem, so lies in the intersection of NP and coNP.
Theorem 4. Deciding if Eve wins a single interval mean-payoff game is in NP∩coNP.
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4.3.1 Memory considerations
The strategies for Adam and Eve described in the proof of Lemma 2 require infinite
memory. We now show, with a careful analysis, that in the case of a single interval this
can be improved.
Theorem 5. Let (G, I) be a single interval mean-payoff game. If Adam has a winning
strategy then he has a positional winning strategy. If Eve has a winning strategy then
she has a strategy that requires finite memory.
Proof. Algorithm 2 consists of repeatedly removing vertices from which Adam can
either ensure the mean-payoff lies above or below I . Clearly Adam has a winning
strategy from any vertex removed: he plays his (positional) winning strategy corre-
sponding to the level at which the vertex was removed, until the play reaches a vertex
removed at an earlier stage. We observe that any consistent play will never return to a
vertex removed at a later stage (as such vertices are in the winning set for Eve at the
same point of the iteration), so this strategy is in fact positional. Any play consistent
with this strategy will eventually stabilize at some stage of the iteration, whereupon
Adam’s strategy for that stage will ensure the mean-payoff lies outside I . We also ob-
serve that this result follows from the fact that the objective is prefix-independent and
convex, so from [14] Adam has a positional winning strategy.
The idea behind Eve’s finite memory strategy on W ∃ is to keep track of the total
weight seen so far (rather than the average as in the proof of Lemma 2) modulo cycles
with average weight in I . This ensures, with the strategy outlined below, that the total
weight will remain within some bounded range, and hence the strategy will only require
finite memory.
By subtracting a constant from the weights of all edges and the interval bounds, we
can assume that 0 ∈ I . We observe on the vertices in W ∃ Eve has two (positional)
strategies: σ< which ensures MP ≤ sup I and σ> which ensures MP ≥ inf I .
Eve’s strategy is to alternate between these two strategies, as in the proof of Lemma 2,
however now she changes when the following condition is met. We keep a stack-based
history of the current play and when a cycle χ is completed we remove it from the
history of the current play, keeping the first vertex of the cycle on the top of the stack.
If w(χ)/|χ| ∈ I we say χ is good and she continues to play her current strategy. If
w(χ)/|χ| /∈ I , she adds w(χ) to a counter. Note that if she was playing σ< she would
only subtract from the counter and if she was playing σ> then she would only add to the
counter because σ< and σ> are winning positional strategies. She switches strategies
if the counter changes sign. That is, if she was playing σ< and the counter value falls
below 0 she switches to σ>, and she switches to σ< if she was playing σ> and the
counter value goes above 0. Clearly this strategy requires only exponential memory:
Eve needs only to store at most |V | vertices in the history and because σ> and σ<
are positional the counter values are bounded by ±|V | ·W . We claim that any play pi
consistent with this strategy has MP (pi) ∈ I .
Let pi be a play consistent with the strategy. Let us consider the state of the strategy
after k steps of the play. Let wk be the total weight of all good cycles popped, and
lk ≤ k their total length. Let ck denote the counter value. We observe that the stack
contents being stored are always a finite prefix of pi (when read from bottom to top), so
we can define sk, the weight of the stack, as the weight of the corresponding prefix. It
is clear from the definition of the strategy that:
w(pi[..k]) = wk + ck + sk.
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Also,−|V | ·W ≤ ck, sk ≤ |V | ·W , and wklk ∈ I . As 0 ∈ I we have inf I ≤ 0 ≤ sup I ,
so
inf I ≤
lk(inf I)
k
≤
wk
k
≤
wk
lk
≤ sup I.
Therefore,
w(pi[..k])
k
≥
−2|V | ·W
k
+ inf I → inf I as k →∞, and
w(pi[..k])
k
≤
2|V | ·W
k
+ sup I → sup I as k →∞.
Hence, as I is closed, MP (pi) ∈ I as required.
5 Discount sum games
In this section we consider interval discount sum games. Here we make a distinction
between whether or not singleton intervals (and singleton gaps between intervals) are
permitted, because unlike other payoff functions considered in this paper there is a
marked difference between the corresponding games. We show that for non-singleton
intervals the problem of determining the winner is PSPACE-complete and as a conse-
quence of our algorithm we show that finite memory stategies suffice. For singleton
intervals (including the exact value problem) our PSPACE-hardness result holds, but is
not even known if determining the winner is decidable. We give a simple example that
shows that infinite memory is required for winning strategies in this case.
5.1 Single, non-singleton intervals
We show that the problem for discount sum games in this case is PSPACE-complete
for any discount factor λ.
Lower bound. To show PSPACE-hardness we reduce from the subset sum game
defined in [9]. The subset sum game is specified by a target t ∈ N and a list of pairs of
natural numbers (a1, a′1), (a2, a′2), . . . , (an, a′n). The game takes n rounds, in round i,
one player (Adam if i is odd, Eve if i is even) chooses ai or a′i. After n rounds Eve
wins if and only if the sum of the selected numbers is t. Given an instance of the subset
sum game we construct the following interval discount sum game (for discount factor
λ):
• V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn+1},
• V∃ = {vi : i is even},
• q0 = v1,
• E and w defined as follows:
– For 1 ≤ i ≤ n there are two edges from vi to vi+1, one with weight aiλi−1
and one with weight a
′
i
λi−1
,
– There is a loop with weight 0 on vn+1.
• I = (t− 1, t+ 1)
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0
Figure 3: Reduction from subset sum games to interval discount sum games
The reduction is illustrated in Figure 3.
Note that as log
(
a
λn
)
= log(a)−n·log(λ) the binary representations of the weights
on this graph are still polynomial in the size of the input, so this is a polynomial time
translation. It is clear that a play in this game corresponds to a selection of elements
from the pairs, and the discounted sum of the play is equal to the sum of the corre-
sponding elements. As this sum is always an integer, the discounted sum lies in the
interval (t− 1, t+1) if and only if the sum is equal to t. Thus this is a polynomial time
reduction from subset sum games to interval discounted sum games.
A corollary of this construction is that positional strategies are not sufficient for
interval discount sum games.
Upper bound. Given v ∈ V and strategies σ and τ for Eve and Adam respectively,
we define vvστ to be the payoff of the unique play from v consistent with σ and τ . Two
important (memoryless) strategies for Eve are σmax and σmin, the strategies which, for
all states v, maximize minτ vvστ and minimize maxτ vvστ respectively.
The idea behind the upper bound centres around the observation that after many
steps the remainder of any play does not contribute much to the overall discounted sum.
If the target interval is non-singleton then after sufficiently many steps the problem
reduces to the classical threshold problem. Thus we can stop the game after finitely
many steps when it becomes a trivial matter to determine if the overall discounted sum
will lie in the interval or not. The key lemma for the result is the following:
Lemma 3. Suppose Eve has a winning strategy to ensure the discounted sum lies in an
interval I , and let
N =
⌊
log(|I|) + log(1− λ)− log(2W )
logλ
⌋
where W is the maximum absolute value of any weight occurring in G. Then Eve has
a winning strategy that agrees with either σmax or σmin after N steps.
Note that whether the strategy agrees with σmax or σmin depends on the play up to
the N -th step. It is feasible that against one strategy of Adam this strategy will agree
with σmax but against another strategy it will agree with σmin.
Proof. We first observe that N is chosen such that for all n > N we have
|I| > λn ·
(
2W
1− λ
)
. (1)
That is, after the N -th step of any play, the overall contribution of the remainder of the
play is restricted to an interval smaller than I .
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Let σ be a winning strategy for Eve. The desired winning strategy will follow σ for
N steps and then one of σmax or σmin depending on the value of the play in a manner
described presently. Suppose after N steps the current play has value x and is in state
v. As σ is a winning strategy, we have for any strategy τ for Adam:
x+ λN+1 · vvστ ∈ I. (2)
Now, as |vvστ | ≤ W1−λ , it follows from (1) and (2) that at least one of the following is
true:
x+ λN+1 ·
W
1− λ
∈ I, or (3a)
x− λN+1 ·
W
1− λ
∈ I. (3b)
If (3a) holds then we follow σmax, otherwise we follow σmin. To show that the resulting
strategy is winning, let us suppose (3a) holds, the case for (3b) being similar. From the
definition of σmax we have, for any state w and any strategy τ of Adam:
v
w
στ ≤ v
w
σmaxτ
≤
W
1− λ
.
Hence it follows from (2) that for any strategy τ of Adam:
x+ λN+1 · vvσmaxτ ≥ x+ λ
N+1 · vvστ ∈ I,
and from (3a):
x+ λN+1 · vvσmaxτ ≤ x+ λ
N+1 ·
W
1− λ
∈ I.
Thus the payoff of any play consistent with this strategy lies in I and is therefore
winning for Eve.
Corollary 2. Finite memory strategies are sufficient in non-singleton interval discount
sum games.
The algorithm for determining the winner of a non-singleton interval discount sum
game is straightforward. We run an alternating Turing Machine for N steps to guess
an initial play. Note that N is polynomial in the size of the input, so this can be done
in PSPACE. Suppose the play ends in state v with the current discounted sum x. We
compute the four values:
maxmax = maxτ v
v
σmaxτ
minmax = minτ v
v
σmaxτ
maxmin = maxτ v
v
σminτ
minmin = minτ v
v
σminτ
.
These are computable in NP ∩ coNP: minmax and maxmin using the standard algo-
rithm for discount sum games, and maxmax (minmin) by fixing σmax (σmin respec-
tively), computed in the previous step, and treating the resulting game as a solitaire
discount sum game with Adam trying to maximize (minimize) the payoff. Finally we
check if either:
x+ λN+1 ·minmax ∈ I and x+ λN+1 ·maxmax ∈ I, or
x+ λN+1 ·minmin ∈ I and x+ λN+1 ·maxmin ∈ I.
It is clear that one of the above conditions holds if and only if σmax or σmin is winning
from the current position. Therefore, from Lemma 3, one of the above conditions holds
if and only if Eve has a winning strategy.
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Theorem 6. Let G be a game graph, I ⊆ R a non-singleton real interval and λ ∈
(0, 1). Deciding if Eve wins the interval discount sum game (G, I, λ) is PSPACE-
complete.
We observe that if the weights, interval bounds and discount factor are all encoded
in unary thenN is logarithmic in the size of the input andmaxmax, minmax, maxmin,
and minmin can all be computed in polynomial time using a pseudo-polynomial time
algorithm for the threshold problem for discount sum games (see e.g. [19]). Thus the
above algorithm runs in polynomial time.
Theorem 7. Let G be a game graph, I ⊆ R a non-singleton real interval and λ ∈
(0, 1) all encoded in unary. Deciding if Eve wins the interval discount sum game
(G, I, λ) is in PTIME.
5.2 Multiple intervals
The algorithm of the previous section also applies to multiple intervals as long as the
gaps between the intervals are also non-singleton. This follows from the observation
that after sufficiently many steps the overall discount payoff will not deviate too far
from the current value, so at that point the game reduces to the single interval case.
Theorem 8. Let G be a game graph, I a finite union of real intervals such that neither
I nor R \ I contains singleton elements, and λ ∈ (0, 1). Deciding if Eve wins the
interval discount sum game (G, I, λ) is PSPACE-complete.
5.3 Singleton intervals
When the set of intervals (or their complement) include singleton intervals, the situa-
tion is more complicated. Following the same argument as the previous section, after
sufficiently many steps the problem reduces to the exact value problem: Given a game
graphG, a discount factor λ ∈ Q and a target t ∈ Q, does Eve have a strategy to ensure
the discounted sum is exactly t?
It is currently open whether this problem is even decidable, however the PSPACE-
hardness result from the previous section (using the interval {t} rather than (t−1, t+1))
gives a lower-bound. The problem is related to the universality problem for discount
sum automata [2], a well-known problem for which decidability remains open [1]. The
problem was also studied for Markov Decision Processes and graphs (i.e. one-player
games) in [7] where it was shown to be decidable for discount factors of the form
λ = 1
n
, and that in general infinite memory is required.
Lemma 4 ( [7]). There exist exact value discount sum games for which an infinite
memory is required for a winning strategy.
6 Total sum games
Total sum games refine mean-payoff games and can be seen as a special case of dis-
count sum games where the discount factor is 1. Assuming the graph has integer
weights, Total will always be an integer (or ±∞), thus we can assume all intervals
are closed or open as necessary.
The objective of total sum games is similar to reachability in one-dimensional vec-
tor addition systems with states [3] and counter reachability games [15], however we
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0
Figure 4: Exact value discount sum game (λ = 23 , t = 0) that requires infinite memory
(modified from [7])
are interested in values seen infinitely often rather than reaching a particular state and
counter value. The complexity bounds we obtain are similar to these problems, indeed
we use the same problems for establishing the bounds. However it is not clear if there
is a more direct reduction between these problems.
6.1 Lower bounds
In this section we establish the following result:
Theorem 9. • The problem of deciding if Eve wins an interval total sum game is
EXP-hard.
• The problem of deciding if Eve wins a unary-encoded interval total sum game is
PSPACE-hard.
6.1.1 Binary encoding
We first show that deciding the winner of interval total sum games is EXP-hard by
reducing from countdown games. A countdown game is played on a weighted graph,
where all weights are negative. The play starts by setting a counter to a given initial
value. Whenever an edge is taken the counter is decremented by the weight. Eve wins
if and only if she reaches a vertex with the counter exactly 0. Deciding the winner
of countdown games is known to be EXP-complete [13]. Note that by subdividing
edges if necessary we can assume that the players play alternately, that is the graph
is bipartite. The reduction is straightforward, given a countdown game G with initial
credit c we construct the following total sum game. We add two new vertices (of Eve)
vI and v⊥. There is an edge from vI to the initial vertex of G with weight c, and an
edge of weight 0 from every vertex of Eve in G to v⊥. Also, for every edge e = (v, v′)
where v is a vertex of Eve we add another edge (v, v⊥) of weight w(e). Finally we
have an edge (v⊥, v⊥) of weight 0. Clearly Eve can ensure Total = 0 if and only if
she can reach v⊥ with a total sum of 0. Thus she can win the interval total sum game,
with interval {0}, if and only if she can win the countdown game.
6.1.2 Unary encoding
For unary-encoded interval total sum games, we reduce from the non-emptiness prob-
lem for one letter alphabet alternating automata, shown to bePSPACE-complete in [12].
Again, the reduction is simple as this problem can be viewed as a countdown game
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where all edges have weight −1 and Eve has to guess the initial credit. The guessing
stage can be implemented by having a loop on vI with weight +1. The remainder of
the reduction is as in the reduction from countdown games.
6.2 Upper bound
We now show that interval total sum games can be solved in EXPSPACE by reducing
them to parity games on infinite graphs described by one-counter machines. Such
games were studied in [17] where determining the winner was shown to be decidable
in PSPACE, but the graphs were described by a unary counter machine, or equivalently,
pushdown graphs with a single-letter alphabet. Here we use a definition corresponding
to the use of a binary-valued counter (also called long-range in [15]). More formally, a
one-counter game graph is described by a tuple (V, V∃, E,E0, w, q0) where (V,E,w)
is a finite weighted graph, V∃ ⊆ V , E0 ⊆ V ×V and q0 ∈ V . The (infinite) unweighted
game graph corresponding to such a tuple is (V × Z, V∃ × Z, E′, (q0, 0)) where E′ is
defined as follows:
• If e = (v, v′) ∈ E then for all c ∈ Z,
(
(v, c), (v′, c+ w(e))
)
∈ E′, and
• If (v, v′) ∈ E0 then
(
(v, 0), (v′, 0)
)
∈ E′.
Intuitively a one-counter game graph is a game graph augmented with a counter which
is incremented or decremented by weights on traversed edges. A special set of edges,
E0, are activated only if the counter has value 0. It is clear a binary one-counter graph
can be described by an exponentially larger unary one-counter graph2, hence our re-
duction yields an EXPSPACE algorithm.
The key observation for the reduction is that interval total sum games can be viewed
as parity games on V × Z, where the second component keeps track of the total sum
seen so far. The priority of a vertex (v, c) is determined by which interval (or gap
between intervals) contains c, in the same manner used in the equivalence between
liminf games and parity games in Section 3. However, we cannot use the result on par-
ity games on one-counter graphs directly for this observation because for those games
the priorities are defined by the states of the counter-machine and not the values of
the counter. Instead, we have Eve assert which interval (or gap between intervals) the
counter is in, and give Adam the ability to punish her if she claims falsely.
Let (V, V∃, E, w, q0, I) be an interval total sum game. Recall from Section 3 the
definition of ΩI . Let us define mi := minΩ−1I (i) and Mi := maxΩ
−1
I (i). We
construct a parity game on a one-counter graph (V ′, V ′∃, E′, E′0, w′, q′0,Ω) as follows.
• V ′ = (V × {0, 1})× [1, 2r + 1] ∪ {ve : e ∈ E} ∪ {v0, v⊥, v⊤};
• V ′∃ = E ∪ {v0, v⊥, v⊤} ∪ {(v, 1, i) : v ∈ V∃ and i ∈ [1, 2r + 1]};
• q′0 = (q0, 1,ΩI(0));
• E′0 = {(v⊥, v0), (v⊤, v0)};
• E′ and w′ given as follows, for all i ∈ [1, 2r + 1]:
– For every e = (v, v′) ∈ E, an edge from (v, 1, i) to ve with weight w(e)
and an edge from ve to (v′, 0, i) with weight 0,
2We allow negative counter values, but this can be handled with non-negative counter values by doubling
the state space
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v, 1, i ve v′, 0, i′ v′, 1, i′
v⊥ v⊤
v0
w(e) 0 0
−mi′ −Mi′
= 0? = 0?
−1 +1
0
Figure 5: Edge gadget for edge e = (v, v′), v /∈ V∃, v′ ∈ V∃
– An edge from (v, 0, i) to v⊥ with weight −mi if mi > −∞,
– An edge from (v, 0, i) to v⊤ with weight −Mi if Mi <∞,
– An edge from (v, 0, i) to (v, 1, i) with weight 0, and
– Loops on v⊥, v⊤ and v0 with weights −1, +1 and 0 respectively.
• Ω((v, 0, i)) = Ω((v, 1, i)) = ΩI(i), Ω(ve) = Ω(v⊥) = Ω(v⊤) = 2r + 1, and
Ω(v0) = 2r.
Intuitively, we create 2r + 1 copies of the game graph (one for each interval and one
for each gap), but replace edges with the edge gadget shown in Figure 5.
We now show that Eve has a winning strategy in this parity game if and only if she
has a winning strategy in the interval total sum game. We first observe that if v⊥ (v⊤) is
reached with a negative (positive) counter value then the edge to v0 is never activated so
the vertex acts as a sink which is winning for Adam. Conversely, if v⊥ (v⊤) is reached
with a non-negative (non-positive) counter value then the loop decrements (increments)
the counter until the edge to v0 is activated, whereupon Eve can win by moving to this
sink which is winning for her. It follows that if the play reaches a vertex (v, 0, i) and the
counter value is outside [mi,Mi] then Adam can win by playing to v⊥ if the counter
is < mi or to v⊤ if the counter is > Mi. On the other hand, if the counter is in the
range [mi,Mi] then Eve wins if Adam plays to either of these vertices. Thus the gadget
defined by the vertices {v⊥, v⊤, v0} allows Adam to punish Eve if the counter is not
in the asserted interval and lets Eve win if Adam attempts to falsely punish her. Now,
assuming Eve plays correctly, it is easy to see that the minimal priority seen infinitely
often corresponds to the lowest interval or interval gap visited infinitely often by the
counter. Thus Eve has a winning strategy in the parity game if and only if she has a
winning strategy in the interval game.
Theorem 10. Deciding if Eve wins an interval total sum game is in EXPSPACE.
We conclude by observing that if the interval game is encoded in unary, then the
above reduction is a polynomial time reduction to the parity games on one-counter
graphs considered in [17], giving an upper bound to match our lower bound.
Theorem 11. Deciding if Eve wins a unary encoded interval total sum game is PSPACE-
complete.
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Figure 6: Interval total sum game (I = R \ {0}) which requires infinite memory
6.3 Memory requirements
We now consider memory requirements for winning strategies in interval total sum
games. We show that, in general, infinite memory is required for winning strategies,
but for single interval games, winning strategies for Eve need only finite memory.
Lemma 5. Finite memory winning strategies are not sufficient in interval total sum
games.
Proof. Consider the game in Figure 6 with the intervals (−∞, 0) ∪ (0,∞). Eve has a
winning strategy in this game: if the play ever reaches q2 then she moves to q≥ if the
total sum is non-negative, and moves to q< otherwise. Clearly any play consistent with
this strategy will have Total 6= 0 so it is winning for Eve. Now suppose Eve plays a
finite memory strategy. It follows there exists a memory state which cannot distinguish
between two distinct sums at q0. Therefore, after taking sufficiently many loops at q1,
it follows that there exists a memory state which cannot distinguish between two sums
of different signs at q2. As Eve’s play depends only on her location and memory state,
there is a total value for which Eve makes the “wrong choice”, i.e. she either moves to
q≥ with a negative sum or to q< with a non-negative sum. Adam’s winning strategy
is then to play to this move of Eve and then to increase or decrease the total sum to 0
before moving to q3.
By exchanging the roles of the players and complementing the interval, we see that
even for single interval games Adam may require infinite memory. We now show this
is not the case for Eve. In fact, we show that having unbounded intervals is necessary
for Eve to not have a finite memory winning strategy.
Lemma 6. Let (G, I) be an interval total sum game where I ∩Z is finite. If Eve has a
winning strategy then she has a finite memory winning strategy.
Proof. As observed in the previous section, we can regard an interval total sum game as
a parity game on V ×Z. It is well known [18] that positional strategies suffice in parity
games, even on infinite graphs. However, in our case such a strategy would depend on
the current state and on the counter value, so it would not immediately be realizable
with finite memory. We now show that if I ∩Z is finite and Eve has a winning strategy
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then we only need to consider a bounded set of counter values so we can realize the
strategy with finite memory. Let σ be a positional winning strategy for Eve on V × Z,
and let I = [inf I, sup I]. If σ is winning from (v, c) where c /∈ I we claim she only
requires finite memory to reach a state (v′, c′) from which σ is winning and where
c′ ∈ I . Consider the finitely-branching, infinite tree of plays consistent with σ from
(v, c)3. Let us cut a branch when it first reaches a vertex (v′, c′) with c′ ∈ I . Note that
as we are following plays consistent with σ, such a state is in the winning set of σ. We
claim the resulting tree is finite. If it were not, then by König’s lemma there exists an
infinite branch, that is, an infinite play consistent with σ that does not reach a vertex
(v′, c′) with c′ ∈ I . As all even priority states are only of the form (v′, c′) where c ∈ I ,
such a play is winning for Adam, contradicting the fact that σ is a winning strategy for
Eve. This finite tree then serves as the memory states for the strategy to reach I from
(v, c). The finite memory strategy is now clear: if the current state is (v, c) with c ∈ I
she moves to σ(v, c). If the play ever reaches a state (v′, c′) with c′ /∈ I she plays her
finite memory strategy until the play returns to (v′′, c′′) with c′′ ∈ I . As σ is positional,
there are at most |V | × |I| of these “out-of-bounds” states reachable (and possibly the
initial state (q0, 0)) so overall we only require finite memory.
To complete the argument for single interval total sum games, we observe that if
the interval is infinite then we are considering the classical threshold problem for total
sum games. Positional strategies for these games were shown to be sufficient in [11].
Theorem 12. Let (G, I) be a single interval total sum game. If Eve has a winning
strategy then she has a finite memory winning strategy.
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